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INTRODUCTION

Since the creation of the first juvenile court in 1899,' the juvenile justice
system has been the center of frequent and intense controversy. Now, as the
system prepares to enter its second century of operation, it is being attacked,
quite literally, from all sides. Many claim that the juvenile justice system has
failed in its seeming inability to stem the tide of youth violence surging
across the country.2 Others claim that the juvenile court has lost sight of its
original mission to care for the best interests of the child and has simply
become a criminal court for children.3 Some argue that young offenders are
treated too harshly,4 while others claim the court coddles children, even
those accused of very serious crimes.5 Embedded in these arguments are
* Technical Assistance Coordinator for the Center for the Study and Prevention of
Violence, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo. Ms. Aultman-Bettridge conducts research
on juvenile homicide, juvenile violence, and prevention programs. She is also a doctoral
candidate in the Graduate School of Public Affairs, University of Colorado, Denver.
1. See BARRY KRISBERG & JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE 30
(1993).
2. See id. at ix.
3. See id. at 1.
4. See id. at 2.
5. See id. at 1.
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underlying assumptions of what the juvenile justice system should or should
not do, and what it is capable of achieving. Disparate views of the purpose
and utility of the juvenile justice system arise from very different
interpretations of what constitutes good policy for dealing with youthful
offenders.
Policies aimed specifically at offenders labeled as chronic, serious, and/or
violent offenders make up a significant portion of recent studies. These
offenders, while making up a very small proportion of youth who are
processed,6 disproportionately account not only for the majority of costs
incurred by the system, but also for the far-ranging controversies that have
plagued its operation.7 The question of how best to respond to chronic,
serious, and/or violent youthful offenders creates conflicts between competing
social and legal ideologies within the U.S. justice system.8 These conflicts
range from the competing justice system ideologies of punishment and
retribution versus treatment and rehabilitation to social and legal definitions
and characteristics of juveniles versus those of adults. 9 The complexity and
intensity of these conflicts have led to a reexamination of the principles,
methods, and goals of the juvenile justice system and have further prompted
calls for its abolition.' 0
A fundamental first step in understanding the characteristics, effectiveness, efficiency, and general impact of juvenile justice policies aimed at
chronic, serious, and/or violent offenders is an examination of the various
methods by which these phenomena have been measured. As with many
social issues, the framework of the analysis itself can produce controversy
and debate. Issues regarding fairness and equity, as well as debates regarding
effectiveness and efficiency, often lie at the heart of disputes in the treatment
of young offenders, particularly when crimes of violence are involved.
Further plaguing research endeavors are questions regarding the definitions
and characteristics of juveniles that are used in discussions of accountability
and amenability to treatment." To date, research practitioners and policymaking communities have been unable to reach a consensus regarding the
criteria for "chronic," "serious," and "violent" offenses. These discrepancies
6. See Barry C. Feld, Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy: Just Deserts and the
Waiver Decision, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 195, 196 (1983).
7. See Jeffrey Fagan, Social and Legal Policy Dimensions of Violent Juvenile Crime, 17
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.

93, 95 (1990).

8. See Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice
Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REv. 965, 1122 (1995).
9. See KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 30.
10. See Francis Barry McCarthy, Should Juvenile Delinquency Be Abolished?, CRIME &
DELINQ., Apr. 1977, at 196, 196; Marvin E. Wolfgang, Abolish the Juvenile Court System,
CAL. LAW., Nov. 1982, at 12, 12.
11. See Wolfgang, supra note 10, at 13 (arguing that the "gravity of the offense not the
age of the offender" should be determinative).
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have impaired research in the area of juvenile justice policy, in part, because
of the lack of an integrated framework for understanding these policies as a
whole.
This article reviews a variety of perspectives that have been applied to
the study of the juvenile justice system in more recent years. While not
meant as an exhaustive summary of the literature on juvenile justice, this
article outlines a number of different frames of reference that have been used
in the analysis of policies aimed at chronic, serious and/or violent juvenile
offenders, with a particular emphasis on framing the nature of the current
controversy and debate. Starting with the social science of the 1970s, which
supported the "nothing works" doctrine of juvenile offender treatment, 2 this
work reviews and summarizes existing analyses of juvenile justice practices
affecting offenders labeled as most problematic to the system. More
specifically, this article discusses three general models that traditionally have
been applied to the analysis of juvenile justice policy. These models can be
classified and described as frameworks and each is built upon one of three
primary subjects of analysis: system outputs (and outcomes), 3 moral,
ethical, and legal decision-making, 14 and broader societal perspectives and
political impacts.' 5
The first model focuses on the outputs of the juvenile justice system,
particularly the effectiveness, efficiency, and systems impact of specific
programs and policies. 16 This framework relies heavily on critiques of and
reactions to past social science research and makes suggestions for
improvements within social science methods. 7 Within the second model
are studies of the decision-making and the fundamental legal and ethical
issues of fairness and equity within the system. 8 The final model includes
analyses focusing on definitional issues and social constructions of the
chronic, serious and/or violent juvenile offender, including the political
impacts of these constructions. 9
These three frameworks are not mutually exclusive and are not inclusive
of all examinations of juvenile justice policy. Indeed, specific policy
questions are often examined through the lenses of two or even all three of
12. See Fagan, supra note 7, at 92.
13. See Rebecca D. Petersen, Expert Policy in Juvenile Justice: Patternsof Claimsmaking
and Issues of Power in a Program Construction, 23 POL'Y STUD. J. 636, 636 (1995).
14. See DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING
37 (1997).
15. See THOMAs J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 4 (1992).
16. See Petersen, supra note 13, at 636 (noting that outcomes can be observed, explained,
and measured).
17. See id. at 647-48.
18. See STONE, supra note 14, at 39.
19. See BERNARD, supra note 15, at 3 (suggesting that the cycle of juvenile justice is
perpetuated by the views of justice officials and the general public).
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these models. However, separating studies according to the characteristics
of these frameworks provides a general method by which analyses can be
categorized, compared, and contrasted. More importantly, the division of
research and analysis into these categories highlights the important role that
underlying assumptions and the formation of research questions play in the
focus and contributions of a study or subset of studies.
In light of earlier observations in this article regarding definitional
difficulties with the terms "chronic," "serious," and "violent," this review
includes research on policies aimed at these specific offenders, as defined and
identified by each analyst. For further clarification, the term "serious violent
offense" generally refers to crimes defined as "violent index crimes" by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation: murder and nonnegligent homicide,
aggravated assault, robbery, and rape.2 °
This article is organized into four parts, corresponding to the model
structure outlined above. Part II begins with a description of the social
science research of the 1970s, which lies at the root of many current
ideological disagreements regarding juvenile justice policies. This part
includes discussion of recent studies that use an outputs-focused framework
and have led to debates regarding the appropriate methods for measuring
success and efficacy; it also details criticisms of this early research. It then
concludes with an examination of the steps taken by the social science
community in response to criticisms of earlier research, including the use of
a wider range of outcome variables and the inclusion of systems impact
analysis in juvenile justice policy research. Part III reviews studies whose
reference frames include issues of fairness and equity. Part IV examines
alternative methods of policy analysis and includes a more in-depth
discussion of the social construction of the chronic, serious, and/or violent
juvenile offender and the relationships between politics, public opinion, and
public policy. Part V summarizes the current state of juvenile justice policy
analysis and makes suggestions for future research.
II.

ANALYZING POLICY OUTPUTS

Social scientists of the 1990s have turned their attention to the inherent
problems of early policy analysis and have attempted to revisit the basic
scientific assumptions of evaluation efforts, more specifically, the role of
positivism in juvenile justice policy analysis. 2 1 Logical positivism, the
notion that "phenomena are observable, explainable, and measurable in

20. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE

UNITED STATES 1996: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 10 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS].

21. See Petersen, supra note 13, at 636.
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quantitative terms," continues to play a dominant role in the analysis of
juvenile justice policy.22 The majority of current research shares a common
bond in that it tends to focus on outputs of juvenile justice policies.23
These outputs can be described as observable phenomena that occur as a
result of the implementation of a specific policy or program.24 Outputs, for
example, can include changes in an individual offender's behavior, changes
or stabilization in crime rates, levels of imprisonment, and costs incurred by
a program. These studies conceptualize the utility and benefits of a given
policy in terms of the policy's effectiveness, economic costs, and systems
impact.26
A.

Analysis of Efficacy

Studies focusing on policy effectiveness are generally concerned with
whether the implementation of a given policy or program has the intended
effect on crime and criminals.27 In the case of policies directed at chronic,
serious, and/or violent juvenile offenders, these outcomes are traditionally
measured through examination of (1) an individual's subsequent violent
criminal activity after participation in a treatment or rehabilitation program
or after a period of incarceration, probation, or other sentence, (2) the overall
levels of violent juvenile crime in a geographical area affected by the policy,
or (3) both.28
Measuring the effects of a given policy often entails the isolation of the
population expected to be affected by the policy. For example, a juvenile
rehabilitation program can only be expected to affect juveniles who
participate in that specific program. However, broadly based and far-ranging
policies, such as a political "tough on crime" stance or a state law reducing
the minimum age at which a juvenile offender may be tried in criminal court,
would be expected to have effects on a larger population than would the
individual rehabilitation program. It then follows that the effectiveness of
these broad polices is best measured by overall rates of juvenile crime and
violence. It certainly can be assumed that much of the public's opinion on
policy effectiveness is based upon perceptions of the general levels of
crime.2 9 However, this method requires the assumption that there is a
direct, causal relationship between the implementation of a given policy and

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 643.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 643-44.
Fagan, supra note 7, at 94.
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rates of crime and violence.30
Jenson and Howard outline two perspectives on the relationship between
public policy and youth crime.31 From the first perspective, youth crime
rates fluctuate mostly, and sometimes completely, independent of changes in
public policy.32 This view contends that juvenile crime rates have remained
relatively unchanged over time because policymakers have not addressed
underlying social problems such as poverty and limited educational and
employment opportunities.33 The second perspective claims that there is a
causal relationship between juvenile offending and public policy and that
"[y]outh crime rates rise or fall ...depending on the effectiveness of
prevailing juvenile justice policy in preventing and controlling delinquency."' 34 In an effort to examine more closely the relationship between policy
and youth crime rates, Jenson and Howard compared national trends in
juvenile arrest rates and self-reported youth offenses with general changes in
juvenile justice policy between 1973 and 1995.35 Using Bernard's theory
that reaction to youth crime cycles between harsher and more lenient
treatments of juvenile offenders,36 the researchers compared offending trends
to shifts between decriminalization or deinstitutionalization policies and more
punitive practices. 37 The comparison suggested that overall youth offending
declined following the adoption of decriminalization and deinstitutionalization
policies 38 and that violent crime rates increased concurrently with the
introduction of punishment-oriented reforms.39
Singer and McDowall employed a more narrowly focused and interrupted
time series experiment 4° to analyze the impact of the New York Juvenile
Offender Law of 1978, which allowed youths as young as thirteen years of
age to be tried directly in criminal court, depending on the offense. 4, They
compared monthly juvenile arrest rates before implementation of the new law
(January 1974 to August 1978) to rates after the law's implementation

30. See Petersen, supra note 13, at 643.
31. See Jeffrey M. Jenson & Matthew 0. Howard, Youth Crime, Public Policy, and
Practice in the Juvenile Justice System: Recent Trends and Needed Reforms, 43 Soc. WORK
324, 324-34 (1998).
32. See id. at 328.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See BERNARD, supra note 15, at 3 (explaining the cycle).
37. See Jenson & Howard, supra note 31, at 327.
38. See id. at 330.
39. See id. at 330-31.
40. See Simon I. Singer & David McDowall, Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deterrent
Effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law, 22 L. & SOC'Y REV. 521, 526 (1988).
41. See id. at 521.
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(September 1978 to December 1984).42 The FBI's Uniform Crime Reports
provided arrest data for juveniles aged thirteen to fifteen for homicide, rape,
robbery, assault, and arson.43 Both control groups and statistical methods
to account for natural rate variation were used to isolate the effects of the
law.' The results indicated no support for the effectiveness of the New
York law.45 Trends in juvenile arrests for the affected age groups did not
differ after implementation of the new law relative to the control groups.'
Tests of deterrence theory in the 1960s and 1970s used similar measures
to compare the severity and certainty of penalties with overall crime rates.47
These studies yielded mixed results on the ability of deterrent penalties to
reduce levels of crime.48 McCord, however, points to limitations in the
design of these studies.4 She argues that while this research has, to a small
degree, informed debate over deterrence theory, studies of individual
offenders are required to answer crucial questions about the correlation
between an individual's perception of sanctions and his or her decision to
commit a crime.5 °
Time series models attempting to compare changes in violent crime and
delinquency rates with specific policy events vary greatly in the rigor of the
methods used, as illustrated above. 51 Regardless of other methodological
considerations, however, the general structure of these studies makes the
interpretation of findings difficult. 52 Jenson and Howard note the inherent
difficulties in this kind of research and vigorously caution that multiple
problems make it difficult to conclude that specific policy changes actually
caused the shift in offending rates in their analysis.53 First, because juvenile
justice policies are often created and implemented at the state and local
levels, aggregated offending statistics, such as those used here, do not
account for differences in policy characteristics and timing on the state or
local level.54 Second, there are possible periods of "lag time" between the
creation and implementation of policies that cannot be accounted for by this

42. See id. at 526.

id. (citing 1996 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 20).
id. at 527.
id. at 530-31.
id. at 531.
Joan McCord, Deterrence and the Light Touch of the Law, in REACTIONS TO
CRIME: THE PUBLIC, THE POLICE, COURTS, AND PRISONS 73, 73-78 (D.P. Farrington & J.
Gunn eds., 1985) (reviewing studies of deterrence theory conducted in the 1960s and 1970s).
48. See id. at 77.
49. See id. at 73-78.
50. See id. at 75.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See
See
See
See
See

51. See id. at 73-78.

52. See id.
53. See Jenson & Howard, supra note 31, at 331.
54. See id.
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research.5 5 Finally, underlying social, demographic, economic, and political
changes occurring during those lag times could affect juvenile crime
rates.56 Therefore, the effects of a single policy cannot be isolated as the
cause of rate changes.
The Singer and McDowall New York study addresses the problems in the
first design.58 By using control groups, they were able to isolate the effects
of a specific policy. 59 However, their research offers multiple explanations
for the failure of the New York law, including poor implementation practices
and flaws in the theory that punishment will deter crime. 6° While the New
York study used what was probably one of the most scientifically defensible
designs under the given conditions,6' it lacks the ability to adequately
explain the law's failure to reduce levels of juvenile crime. Explanations
given by the authors are theoretical at best.62
Problems with these research designs raise the question of how well a
law or other form of policy can be measured using a broad variable like
juvenile arrests, even if the arrests are disaggregated by age group, offense
type, and so forth. Related to this is whether overall measures of arrest rates
are the best indicators of a policy's success. Singer and McDowall state: "It
is possible that the law failed to reduce crime because it did not sufficiently
increase the risks of punishment. If this explanation is accepted, however,
it leaves open the question of how63high the risks of punishment must be to
affect juvenile crime appreciably.,
As indicated by Singer and McDowell, the study results could be
interpreted as follows: (1) New York's law was too weak to have a deterrent
effect, (2) the law was not enforced or implemented properly, or (3) the
64
threat of punishment, in general, failed to reduce overall levels of crime.
Of course, these study results could also be due to a combination of the
above mentioned factors. Ultimately, this research is useful because it
demonstrates that the law did not have the desired effect.6 5 However, the
study's utility ends with its inability to provide more information that might
inform future laws or policy.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
Singer & McDowall, supra note 40, at 527-28.
id. at 527.
id. at 532-33.
id. at 526-27.
id. at 532-33.
id. at 532.
id. at 532-33.
id. at 532.
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B.

Analyzing Individual Program Efficacy

An alternative to examining the impact of broader policy orientations on
overall rates of juvenile violent offending is the analysis of the effects of a
specific program or practice on an individual's violent behavior. In general,
such analyses take place within the context of the particular policy orientation
of a specific program or practice, for example, treatment programs versus
incarceration or other criminal sanctions. Measures of recidivism make up
the largest portion of variables used to assess program efficacy for chronic
and serious violent juvenile offenders. Recently, however, researchers have
shifted to the use of a broader set of measures, in reaction, in part, to
problems identified with the social science research of the 1970s.
Martinson's review of evaluations on the efficacy of treatment programs
for juvenile offenders was one of the most comprehensive and influential
works in this area during the 1970s. 66 The conclusion of this research was
Martinson's own pronouncement that "almost nothing works." 67 His review
of more than 200 juvenile treatment program studies measured program
success through a single measure of recidivism - that is, whether or not the
juvenile receiving the treatment committed another offense after leaving the
program.68 This view defined "program success" in narrow, rigorous
terms.69 Ultimately, either the program reduced recidivism and was70
therefore deemed successful, or it did not and was labeled unsuccessful.
In a later discussion of these findings, Martinson defended this stance by
explaining that treatments could not be partially effective, comparing the
notion "to a partly pregnant girlfriend.", 71 Based on these findings,
Martinson concluded that the rehabilitation of chronic, serious, and/or violent
offenders was a fruitless endeavor and advocated a greater use of deterrence
and incapacitation.72 Additional reviews conducted during this period and
results of later 1979 studies reached similar conclusions: either treatment

66. See Barry Krisberg et al., Graduated Sanctions for Serious, Violent, and Chronic
Juvenile Offenders, in A SOURCEBOOK: SERIOUS, VIOLENT AND CHRONIC JUVENILE
OFFENDERS 142, 145 (James C. Howell et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter A SOURCEBOOK]; Fagan,
supra note 7, at 96. Martinson published his review in 1974. See generally Robert
Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About PrisonReform, 36 PUB. INTEREST 2245 (1974).
67. See Fagan, supra note 7, at 96-100 (quoting Martinson, supra note 66, at 96
(discussing the "almost nothing works" doctrine)).
68. See CHARLES H. SHIREMAN & FREDERIC G. REAMER, REHABILITATING JUVENILE
JUSTICE 84-85 (1986).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 86 (quoting Robert Martinson, Evaluation in Crisis - A Postscript, in
REHABILITATION, RECIDIVISM, AND RESEARCH (Nat'l Council on Crime & Delinq. ed., 1976)).

72. See Krisberg et al., supra note 66, at 145.

350

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 10

programs did not work or evaluation findings were too inconclusive to
support the notion that treatment programs were effective for juvenile
offenders.7 3
More recently, researchers have taken issue with the interpretation of
these findings, cautioning that a failure to prove a program's effectiveness is
not equal to proof that efforts are ineffective.74 Martinson's broad statement
that "nothing works," in reality, was a claim that his review did not identify
a general type of program that consistently was proven effective.75 In a
later reanalysis of Martinson's data, Palmer noted that some of the programs
in the study did have promising and positive results.76 In a separate review
of correctional programs aimed at juvenile offenders, Riedel and Thornberry
cautioned that their own findings, as well as those of Martinson and his
colleague, Lipton, were vulnerable to many research design flaws.77
Although this research suggests that the evaluated projects were
failures, that conclusion does not lead ineluctably to the disavowal
of the rehabilitative ideal. For one thing, this conclusion is based on
a finite number of studies. Indeed, given the flexible criteria and the
scope of the literature search in the study by Lipton [and Martinson],
et al., it is surprising that they uncovered only 231 studies to
evaluate - an average of only 11.5 studies per year for their study
period. Moreover, many of these studies... are methodologically
flawed, resulting in a small number of conclusive studies. To
repudiate the rehabilitative ideal on such scant evidence would
merely throw the criminal justice system into a fruitless search for
a solution to the crime problem.78
Despite the problems with Martinson's original research and warnings
from other analysts about these problems, the "nothing works" doctrine was
readily accepted both by the general public and many policymakers within
juvenile justice.79 More recent research seems to refute the conclusion that
no form of rehabilitative treatment is effective with chronic, serious, and/or
violent juvenile offenders and the only way to protect society is to effectively

73. See Fagan, supra note 7, at 97 (listing various studies).
74. See id. at 97-100.
75. See SHIREMAN & REAMER, supra note 68, at 87-88.
76. See id. at 85 (citing Ted Palmer, Abstract: Martinson Revisited, 22 CRIME & DELINQ.
178 (1976)).
77. See Marc Riedel & Terence P. Thomberry, The Effectiveness of Correctional
Programs:An Assessment of the Field, in THE CHILDREN OF ISHMAEL: CRITICAL PERSPECTWES ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 418, 430 (B. Krisberg & J. Austin eds., 1978).
78. Id. (footnote omitted).
79. See Fagan, supra note 7, at 96-97.
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incapacitate them.8'
Following Martinson's initial work, a review of juvenile diversion
program evaluations recorded by Sandhu and Heasley yielded mixed
results." The majority of the evaluations listed in this work showed that
juveniles who participated in juvenile diversion programs had lower
recidivism rates than control groups, as measured by subsequent arrest
records. 2 Some evaluations, however, found no difference in these rates,
and one program evaluation found that diversion program youths exhibited
higher rates of recidivism. 3 Two recent surveys of community-based84
alternatives to incarceration have reported somewhat more positive results.
Jones and Krisberg document the results of multiple reviews of correctional
programs aimed at the treatment of chronic, serious, and/or violent juvenile
offenders.85 They found "substantial evidence" that community programs
that featured a highly structured environment could effectively manage and
supervise chronic juvenile offenders.86 They conclude that "[o]n balance,
the existing research indicates that highly structured community programs
produce recidivism outcomes comparable or better than those of training
schools. 87
In a 1995 survey of program evaluations conducted since the 1960s,
Krisberg and his colleagues found considerable support for the conclusion
that community-based programs are at least as effective as traditional youth
correctional programs. 8 This review included results from a 1979 study
conducted by Murray and Cox of the Unified Delinquency Intervention
Services programs in Chicago. 89 Their research was the first to employ the
"suppression effect" as an outcome measure in the study of program
efficacy.90 Murray and Cox defined the suppression effect as a reduction
in frequency of reoffending, as opposed to simple recidivism. 9' The
research found that the Chicago intervention program had a significant
80. See id. at 100-02; Krisberg et al., supra note 66, at 145.
81. See HARJrr S. SANDIU & C. WAYNE HEASLEY, IMPROVING JUVENILE JUSTICE:
POWER ADVOCACY, DIVERSION, DECRIMINALIZATION, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, AND DUE
PROCESS 108-12 (1981).

82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See MICHAEL A. JONES & BARRY KRISBERG, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND
DELINQ., IMAGES AND REALITY: JUVENILE CRIME, YOUTH VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 36-

39 (1994); Krisberg et al., supra note 66, at 143-44.
85. See JONES & KRISBERG, supra note 84, at 36-39.
86. Id. at 37.
87. Id.
88. See Krisberg et al., supra note 66, at 145-46.
89. See id. at 145 (citing CHARLES A. MURRAY & LOUIS A. Cox, BEYOND PROBATION
(1979)).
90. Id.
91. See id.
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suppression effect, with program participants exhibiting "large" reductions in
the incidence (frequency) of their reoffending.92
Over the past twenty-five years, research also has been conducted on
state systems that utilized the various individual programs reviewed.93
These efforts have concentrated on the determination of the efficacy of a
general movement by states toward more community-based, rehabilitationoriented models of juvenile justice service delivery.94 The most notable of
these are studies conducted on the Massachusetts, Maryland, and Utah state
reforms of the 1970s. 95 Initial studies conducted on a sample of youths
participating in the Massachusetts reform program, who were released in
1974, found that these youths had higher rates of recidivism than those
released in 1968 from juvenile training schools.96 Closer analysis of these
data, however, indicated that community-based programs were implemented
to varying degrees throughout the state, and corresponding recidivism rates
differed greatly by jurisdiction.9 7 After the Massachusetts reforms had been
in effect for a longer period of time and implementation issues were better
resolved, additional evaluations were conducted.98
A second study
concluded that recidivism rates for youth in community-based programs were
equal to or lower than their training school counterparts." Further analysis
showed that juvenile crime rates did not increase after the training schools
closed, as was anticipated by many opponents of the new system. 1°°
Studies conducted on the Utah juvenile justice system had reached similar,
positive conclusions regarding community-based programs for youth.' 1
Another study of community-based programs implemented during statewide
reform efforts in Maryland, however, concluded that youths in these
programs had higher recidivism rates than those who had been in a training
school program, which subsequently shut down. 10 2 However, it has been
noted that this evaluation was conducted very early in the Maryland
03
experiment, shortly after the training school had been closed.1

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 146-47.
id.
id.
id. at 146 (citing ROBERT B. COATES ET AL., DIVERSITY IN A YOUTH
CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM (1978)).
97. See id.
98. See id.

99. See id. (citing BARRY

KRISBERG ET AL., UNLOCKING JUVENILE CORRECTIONS

100. See id. at 151.
101. See id. at 146 (citing BARRY

(1989)).

KRISBERG ET AL., THE IMPACT OF JUVENILE COURT

(Nat'l Council on Crime & Delinq. ed., 1988)).
102. See id. at 146-47 (citing D.C. GOTrFREDSON

SANCTIONS

DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS

103. See id.

(1992)).

&

W.H.

BARTON,
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A study by Schneider and Schram of the State of Washington's
movement towards a "justice" or "just deserts" model of juvenile justice
yielded less certain results."° The Washington model was largely characterized as one that emphasized protection of the public, accountability of
juvenile offenders, and uniformity in treatment of juvenile offenders."10
Analysis of recidivism rates under the new system identified two outcomes. 106 First, recidivism varied greatly by jurisdictions within the
state.' 7 Second, the recidivism rates for juveniles under the new system
increased in two jurisdictions.10 8 In this study, however, Schneider and
Schram note that these effects could not be separated from possible increases
in police activity due to processing changes in the law."° Similar research
by Kriswell and Howell on correctional programs in Florida found very high
rates of recidivism for all offenders in the system." 0 However, the lowest
rates were reported for those participating in nonresidential programs, while
the highest rates of recidivism were documented for those in the most secure
facilities."' Krisberg and Howell advise caution when interpreting these
results, however, because the study did not control for differing levels of risk
12
for individual offenders.'
A recent study by Fagan has produced data regarding the recidivism of
offenders processed through the juvenile court system, compared to the
recidivism of youth sentenced in adult court."i 3 Given recent legislative
efforts to widen the jurisdiction of the adult criminal court over offenses
committed by those under the statutory age of eighteen, it has become
increasingly important to examine whether this policy elicits better outcomes
on recidivism."' Fagan compared the deterrent effects of criminal court
and juvenile court on a sample of 800 youth in four urban counties.'"

104. See Anne Larason Schneider & Donna D. Schram, The Washington State Juvenile
Justice System Reform: A Review of Findings, 1 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REv. 211, 233 (1986).
105. See id. at 213 fig.l.
106. See id. at 231.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 230-31.
110. See Barry Krisberg & James C. Howell, The Impact of the Juvenile Justice System and
Prospectsfor Graduated Sanctions in a Comprehensive Strategy, in SERIOUS AND VIOLENT
JUVENILE OFFENDERS: RISK FACTORS AND SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTIONS 346, 348 (Rolf

Loeber & David P. Farrington eds., 1998) [hereinafter SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE
OFFENDERS].
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See Jeffrey Fagan, Separating the Men from the Boys:, The Competitive Advantage of
Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders,
in A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 66, at 238, 244-52.

114. See id at 239.
115. See id. at 245.
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Using the broader measures of recidivism that have come into common use
in recent years, Fagan measured the deterrent effects of juvenile and adult
court outcomes on rates of recidivism (rearrest), rates of reincarceration,
failure rates (the amount of time elapsed to first rearrest), and offending rates
(Murray and Cox's "suppression effect")., 6 The general findings of the
study concluded that sentencing in adult court did not ensure
lower
7
recidivism rates, compared to the use of juvenile court sanctions."
Current analysis of individual program successes, as well as reviews of
overall statewide reforms, sheds new light on the effectiveness of specific
programs or system implementations." 8 However, this research, like that
of Martinson and his colleagues, thus far has been largely unable to isolate
general types of interventions as more effective than others. 9 The recent
application of meta-analysis techniques to the study of programs for juvenile
offenders might contribute much to our understanding of which types of
intervention strategies hold the most promise.' 20 Meta-analyses calculate
a common measure of treatment or an "effect size" that can be applied to all
of the studies within an analysis.' 2' This "statistical synthesis" allows for
both the understanding of how an average individual in a treatment group
compares to a counterpart in a control group (based on a percentile score)
and the ability to compare effect sizes across a variety of treatment
types. 2 2 In more recent years, this technique has been used most notably
23
by Mark Lipsey to study treatment programs for juvenile offenders.
In an early review of treatment programs for juvenile offenders, Roberts
and Camasso conducted a meta-analysis of forty-six programs, using
recidivism as the primary outcome measure. 24 This analysis found strong,
125
positive effects for only one treatment type: family counseling programs.
However, it should be noted that of the forty-six studies included in the
analysis, many had weak research designs. 126 Roberts and Camasso noted
that a large amount of research done on juvenile offender treatment programs

116. See id. at 249-50.
117. See id. at 252.
118. See Mark W. Lipsey & David B. Wilson, Effective Interventionfor Serious Juvenile
Offenders, in SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 110, at 313, 330.
119. See id. at 335.
120. See id. at 335-36.
121. See id. at 314.
122. See Albert R. Roberts & Michael J. Camasso, The Effect of Juvenile Offender
Treatment Programs on Recidivism: A Meta-Analysis of 46 Studies, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHIcS & PUB. POL'Y 421, 423 (1991).
123. See Lipsey & Wilson, supra note 118, at 314.
124. See Roberts & Camasso, supra note 122, at 422-24.
125. See id. at 437-38.
126. See id. at 437.
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is descriptive and anecdotal.127 Of the forty-six programs reviewed that did
employ a scientific design, sixteen did not use any kind of comparison group
and twenty-six analyzed samples that were smaller than 200.128 These
as
observations led the authors to cite the primary finding of this study
"research on juvenile offenders is in its early stage of development."' 129
This meta-analysis and the later work of Mark Lipsey contain reviews of
general treatment programs for a wide variety of juvenile offenders. 3 °
This research, largely due to a dearth of studies to analyze, did not allow for
an examination of interventions directed specifically at chronic, serious,
and/or violent juvenile offenders.13 ' However, Lipsey and Wilson have
since analyzed a subset of the studies included in Lipsey's earlier work,
selecting those that focused on serious offenders, or at least reported on the
effects of treatment on that particular group. 3 2 This analysis is further
unique in that it considered a wide variety of factors that may affect
treatment outcomes. 33 The study reported effects separately for institutional and noninstitutional treatment interventions and examined effect size in
relation to four variables: (1) characteristics of offenders, for example, prior
offense, prior violence, gender, and race, (2) general program characteristics,
for example, age of the program, type of treatment provider (such as mental
health, criminal justice, or other), and penal status of the juveniles during
treatment), (3) treatment type, for example, restitution, counseling, or
multiple methods, and (4) the amount of treatment, for example, average
number of34weeks from first to last treatment event and frequency of treatment
delivery.

1

The Lipsey and Wilson review provides much information on a variety
of programs aimed at serious offenders, both in institutional and
noninstitutional settings. 135 These programs demonstrated wide variations
in success, with some programs producing reductions in recidivism as high
as forty percent and others having negligible effects. 136 However, in light
of the claims made by earlier social science researchers that nothing is
effective, this study, along with many others of the past decade reviewed in
this article, is significant because it provides more promising evidence that
effective interventions can be implemented for chronic, serious, and/or violent
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juvenile offenders. 37 Although it has been largely refuted in more recent
years, through the use of social science methods that, in many cases, are
superior to those used in Martinson's original research, the "nothing works"
doctrine still might influence the creation and implementation of juvenile
justice policy. Research findings that indicate the promise of success in a
variety of juvenile offender treatment programs, however, address only one
element of the juvenile justice policy debate. In addition to individual
program effectiveness, issues of policy and program cost, as well as systemwide impact, play a large role in the discussion of appropriate and successful
juvenile justice policy.
C. Analyzing the Efficiency of Policies and Programs
A more limited body of research exists regarding cost-benefit analysis of
policies aimed at chronic, serious, and/or violent juvenile offenders. This
research most often measures the costs of one intervention compared with
another - treatment programs versus incarceration, for example. 138 These
costs are then related to rough estimates of the effectiveness of each type of
intervention.139 Jones and Krisberg, for example, cite past research that
estimated the costs for the state to incarcerate one juvenile to be between
$35,000 and $60,000 per year."4 These authors also point to data that
support the conclusion that an average of thirty-one percent of juveniles
facilities could be placed in less secure settings at
currently housed in state
41
a lower taxpayer cost.'
Studies of the California Youth Authority (CYA) program of the 1960s
concluded that longer juvenile sentences would be bad policy, noting among
other issues, that the costs would be substantial and would probably only
produce a one to three percent reduction in recidivism.44 Further, a U.S.
Department of Justice evaluation estimated that CYA's growth in the use of
probation as an alternative to incarceration saved the state over $60 million
between 1970 and June 1972.14' The same study found that there was not
any greater risk of recidivism for probationers than for offenders in

137. See id.
138. See JONES & KRISBERG, supra note 84, at 28-29 (finding that 31% of incarcerated
juveniles could be placed in less secure settings).
139. See id.
140. See id. at 29.
141. See id. at 28.
142. See Krisberg & Howell, supra note 110, at 351.
143. See CHARLES P. SMITH ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF
SERIOUS JUVENILE CRIME AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE NEED FOR A RATIONAL
RESPONSE, VOLUME III: LEGISLATION, JURISDICTION, PROGRAM INTERVENTIONS, AND

CONFIDENTIALITY OF JUVENILE RECORDS 167 (1980).
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traditional corrections.' A study by RAND Corporation researchers found
that through a combination of delinquency prevention and treatment
programs, the number of serious crimes, defined as crimes of violence plus
produced by the
burglary, could be reduced to levels comparable to those
45
cost.
the
one-fifth
than
less
at
and
"three strikes" law,
One possible explanation for the existence of few comprehensive analyses
in the juvenile justice policy literature is the difficulty of assigning costs to
constructs such as the protection of society or the rehabilitation of the
offender. In a 1980 economic impact report, for example, the U.S.
Department of Justice defined a variety of costs that must be measured in
order to determine the economic impact of specific juvenile justice
policies.' 46 The report outlined direct costs of crime, in terms of loss of
human life, costs of injury or threatened injury, and costs incurred by
witnesses. 147 Indirect costs were defined as increased expenditures for
security and insurance, increased annual taxes, diminished quality of life in
one's neighborhood, and processing costs for juvenile offenders.14a The
obvious difficulty in quantifying many of these variables is but one of the
many criticisms of this kind of approach.' 49
An alternative to solely weighting economic factors in analyses of
efficiency is to examine broader impacts. Such an analysis would include
both the economic and noneconomic impact of a given policy on the juvenile
justice system. Much research in the areas of juvenile detention, diversion,
and incarceration policies has combined cost factors with other variables,
including the quality of policy implementation, adherence to policy, facility
overcrowding, and the necessity of restrictive practices.
In a review of national pretrial detention policy, Schwartz and Willis
argue that detention rates are skyrocketing in the United States, and with
them system costs are increasing dramatically. 50 The authors further argue
that detention centers are not being used as intended, that is, to protect the
public from youths who are genuinely dangerous to the community, and that
research has proven that community-based alternatives to detention would

144. See id.
145. See PETER W. GREENWOOD Er AL., DIVERTING CHILDREN FROM A LIFE OF CRIME:
MEASURING COSTS AND BENEFITS, at xiii (1996).
146. See CHARLES P. SMITH ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF
SERIOUS JUVENILE CRIME AND THE NEED FOR A RATIONAL RESPONSE, VOL. IV: ECONOMIC

IMPACT, at xv (1980).

147. See id. at 4.
148. See id. at 4-5.
149. See id.; see also DAVIS B. BOBROW & JOHN S. DRYZEK, POLICY ANALYSIS BY
DESIGN 37 (1987).
150. See Ira M. Schwartz & Deborah A. Willis, National Trends in Juvenile Detention, in
REFORMING JUVENILE DETENTION: No MORE HIDDEN CLOSETS 13, 16, 19 (Ira M. Schwartz
& William H. Barton eds., 1994) [hereinafter REFORMING JUVENILE DETENTION].
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achieve the desired community protection ends at a much reduced cost.' 5 '
Similar research on detention reforms in Broward County, Florida found it
possible to reduce the overcrowding in detention centers without increasing
the need to
risks to public safety and with a possible cost savings, since
152
eliminated.
be
would
centers
detention
construct additional
The importance of understanding the wide variety of system impacts
created by policy implementation and change has led many researchers to call
for a definitional broadening of what constitutes good policy in the area of
detention. These researchers stress the need to consider population control,
facility overcrowding, cost-savings, and public safety within a comprehensive
framework in order to make informed judgements regarding policy
effects. 53
'
D. Summary of Policy Output Analyses
Thus far, this article has rested on an important assumption - that the
goal of the juvenile justice system, with respect to chronic, serious, and/or
violent offenders, is to reduce levels of juvenile crime in an efficient manner.
It is certainly reasonable to assume that this is probably one of the primary
goals of juvenile justice. Further, as illustrated, the majority of research falls
into this category of analysis. However, as current philosophical debate and
political rhetoric indicate, more issues are involved when considering juvenile
justice policy implementation. Some policy researchers have criticized the
exclusive use of these kinds of social science approaches to policy
analysis. 4 These critiques are largely framed in the broader context of
attacks on logical positivism in general.'55
"[In the positivistic view], reality consists of a world of objectivelydefined facts that can be measured scientifically."'' 56 As discussed earlier,
applying this kind of objective framework of quantifiable phenomena to an
analysis of juvenile justice policy is problematic, at least in part.157

151. See id. at 19-20.
152. See William H. Barton et al., Reducing the Use of Secure Detention in Broward
County, Florida, in REFORMING JUVENILE DETENTION, supra note 150, at 69, 88.
153. See generally James E. Anderson & Robert G. Schwartz, Secure Detention in
Pennsylvania, 1981-1990: The Experience After Coleman v. Stanziani, in REFORMING
JUVENILE DETENTION, supra note 150, at 128, 128-46 (stressing the importance of policy and
standards in detention); Joseph T. Christy, Toward a Model Secure Detention Program:
Lessons from Shuman Center, in REFORMING JUVENILE DETENTION, supra note 150, at 108,
108-27; Carl V. Sanniti, Controlling Juvenile Detention Population: Strategies for Reform,

in REFORMING JUVENILE DETENTION, supra note 150, at 97, 97-107 (discussing how policy
affects detention center population).

154. See Peterson, supra note 13, at 636.
155. See id.

156. Id.
157. See id.
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Martinson's construction of reoffending as a dichotomous variable has come
under attack in recent years.158 This, along with other research flaws, has
led to a reexamination of the role social science might play in the scrutiny
of juvenile justice policies.' 59 However, even critics of positivist views of
policy analysis do not call for their complete eradication."6 DeLeon, for
example, suggests expanding upon and augmenting positivist-based analysis
as a way to ameliorate some of the concerns raised by its critics.' 6 '
For one, they must face up to a situation in which resolutions are
more humanistic and less "scientific" without surrendering the
requisite standards. This is less to indicate a reduction of rigor and
more toward the variety of ways in which 62
policy tools may be
brought to bear for a multitude of conditions.1
In more recent years, calls have come for an examination of the impacts
of juvenile justice policy that goes beyond results, or outputs. Many analysts
have chosen to include the examination of decision-making in juvenile
justice, particularly as decision-making pertains to issues of fairness, equity,
and rights.
II.

ISSUES OF FAIRNESS, EQUITY, AND RIGHTS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE

Deborah Stone's examination of politics and policy formation closely
examines issues of equity and rights. 163 Her analysis of equity, however,
is framed entirely on the issue of the equitable distribution of resources.' 64
Whether this kind of analysis can be applied to the distribution of punishments has not been addressed in juvenile justice policy analysis. In general,
issues of equity have been described more in terms of fairness, that is, are
punishments within the juvenile justice system fair and consistent?' 65 The
general assumption of those analyzing this aspect of juvenile justice is that
in order for punishment to be fair, it must treat similar offenses in a similar
manner. 166
At the forefront of the debate on fairness in juvenile justice are two
issues. First, is there an unequal distribution of punishment that is based on

158. See
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

SHIREMAN & REAMER, supra note 68, at 85.
See id.
See PETER DELEON, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICY SCIENCES (1997).
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Id. at 10.
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the racial and ethnic characteristics of offenders? 167 Second, are juveniles
treated differently than adults based on the same offense? 168 A concept
common to these questions is the wide use of subjective decision-making
within juvenile justice systems. The degree to which these kinds of decisions
result in unfair or inequitable treatment has been the subject of much
research.
A.

Minorities in Juvenile Justice

The overrepresentation of members of ethnic minority groups in
confinement within the juvenile justice system is well documented. Research
by Feld has reported minority status to be a significant predictor of sentence
length among juveniles, even when offense characteristics are controlled. 69
This analysis showed longer sentences for African American,
Hispanic, and
70
Native American males than for Caucasian males.
An examination of the California juvenile justice system found that
African American males are overrepresented, in proportion to their population
in the general public, while whites are underrepresented. 171 A number of
other studies have reached similar conclusions: often, minority groups are
more likely to be confined and receive harsher punishment in the juvenile
7
justice system than whites, even when accounting for offense variables.1 1
Regardless of whether a policy is effective, this issue of the disparate effects
on minority groups is an important consideration when determining what is
"good policy." Research thus far indicates that efforts to implement policies
that are equitable among all racial and ethnic groups have not been
73
successful.

B.

Juveniles in Criminal Court

Another issue in juvenile justice policy analysis focuses on how decisions
167. See Barry C. Feld, The Social Context of Juvenile Justice Administration: Racial
Disparities in an Urban Juvenile Court, in MINORITIES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 66, 69-74 (K.K.
Leonard & C.E. Pope eds., 1995).
168. See JONES & KRISBERG, supra note 84, at 25 fig.10.
169. See Feld, supra note 167, at 73.
170. See id.
171. See James Austin, The Overrepresentation of Minority Youths in the California
Juvenile Justice System: Perceptionsand Realities, in MINORITIES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra
note 167, at 153, 155.
172. See Stephen D. Gottfredson & G. Roger Jarjoura, Race, Gender,and Guidelines-Based
Decision Making, 33 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 49, 49-69 (1996) (discussing the causes of
disparities in the representation of races in jail and prison populations); Michael J. Leiber &
Katherine M. Jamieson, Race and Decision Making Within Juvenile Justice: The Importance
of Context, 11 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 363, 363-88 (1995) (discussing the effects of
racial stereotyping on the treatment of African American juveniles).
173. See Gottfredson & Jarjoura, supra note 172, at 49.
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are made regarding the best policies for dealing with chronic, serious, and/or
violent juvenile offenders, particularly how youths are waived to adult
criminal court. 174 This topic produces two primary issues of debate. The
first issue, directly related to notions of fairness and equity, is whether75
decisions to waive juveniles to criminal court are appropriately made.
The second issue is whether the practice of waiving juveniles to adult court
has the intended effect of making sanctions more certain and more severe
than they would be in juvenile court. 176 Two primary justice system
philosophies are at stake here: the "just deserts" model of criminal justice,
which generally contends that individuals deserve certain levels of punishments based on their crimes, and the rehabilitative model upon which the
foundation of a separate juvenile system rests and which contends that
juveniles are less accountable for their crimes than adults. 177 The issue of
waiving juveniles to adult court further raises the question of the legal rights
enjoyed by juvenile offenders in criminal court.
Fagan argues that beliefs in the ineffectiveness of treatment interventions
for juveniles led to increases in juvenile waivers to adult court during the
1980s and 1990s.1 78 However, these waivers do not ensure a greater
likelihood of sanctions, nor do they produce harsher sanctions than would
occur in a juvenile court. 179 Two primary mechanisms for transferring a
youth to criminal court have been identified in the literature, judicial waivers
and legislative waivers.18 In the first case, the court judge may decide to
waive an offender to criminal court, usually based on perceptions of the
offender's dangerousness or amenability to treatment.' 8'
Feld claims that this process, because it relies solely on the subjective
decision of one judge, is inherently unfair to defendants and leads to unequal
treatment of offenders. 182 Feld argues that therefore the only objective way
183
to make such crucial decisions is through a legislative waiver process.
In legislative waivers, a youth is automatically transferred to criminal court
depending on the youth's present offense and prior record.' 84 Supporters
of this kind of waiver suggest that this treats individuals more fairly and is
less prone to issues of personal bias or discrimination. "[A] system of justice

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Feld, supra note 6, at 196.
id. at 197.
id. at 206.
id. at 202-05.
Fagan, supra note 7, at 96.
Feld, supra note 6, at 206.
id. at 197.
id. at 198.
id. at 208.
id.
id.

362

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 10

that responds to people on the basis of what they do, rather than on the basis
of what someone else believes they need'I 5or predicts they will become, can
be held accountable by the community." 8
Osbun and Rode, however, argue that the "objective" legislative waiver
does not exist. 186 First, they point out that many states have multiple
transfer mechanisms. 187 Therefore, the presence of a legislative standard
does not guarantee that only objectively defined youth will be waived to
criminal court.1 88 Second, Osbun and Rode contend that the "automatic
transfer" under legislative waiver merely takes the subjective decision out of
the hands of the judge and places it in the hands of the prosecutor.' 89 This
practice is more unfair, they argue, because it waives youth who, although
arrested for a serious violent offense, have no prior records and do not
represent a danger sufficient to warrant trial in criminal court.1 9° Further,
prosecutors may decide to charge a youth with a specific offense based on
the prosecutor's subjective judgment of whether the youth should be tried in
juvenile or criminal court.191
C.

The Rights of Juveniles

Waiver to criminal court represents only one kind of juvenile justice
policy that can blur the line between juvenile court and adult criminal court.
In fact, many have argued that the two systems have become enough alike
that the utility of a separate juvenile system has been lost. 192 Both
contributing to and partially as a result of this controversy, the question of
the legal rights enjoyed by juveniles has become critical in the past thirty
years. Stone discusses two concepts of rights that exist in American
thinking.19 3 Positive rights are those guaranteed through the power of the
state. 94 Normative rights, on the other hand, are those that come from
other sources.1 95 Concepts such as natural rights and universal human
rights fall into this category.' 96 Certainly the rights of persons accused of
a crime are positive rights, not only guaranteed by law, but also seen as

185. Id. at 210.
186. See Lee Ann Osbun & Peter A. Rode, ProsecutingJuveniles as Adults: The Quest for
"Objective" Decisions, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 187, 200 (1984).
187. See id. at 189.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 197.
190. See id. at 199.
191. See id. at 196.
192. See McCarthy, supra note 10, at 198; Wolfgang, supra note 10, at 12.
193. See STONE, supra note 14, at 323.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 324.
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crucial enough by this country's founders to be enumerated in the
Constitution.' 97
The legal rights of juveniles, however, are less clear. Certainly, it would
seem reasonable to assume that a juvenile accused of a crime would be in
need of the same protections as those afforded to an adult, because in both
cases the individual's liberty is at stake. However, the original juvenile court
movement, in stressing informality in juvenile court proceedings and the
desire for the state to have the power to act in "the best interests of the
child," did not address a juvenile's right to due process. 198 Nonetheless,
U.S. Supreme Court decisions of the past thirty years have extended many
criminal court due process rights to youths in juvenile court and to those
being waived.to criminal court. 199 Embedded in the issue of juvenile due
process rights is the question of differences in the degree of accountability
for juvenile offenders and for adult offenders, implied in the rationale for the
creation of the juvenile court system. How youthful offenders, even those
accused of serious and violent crimes, differ from adults in responsibility and
accountability becomes a question of utmost importance in the modem
juvenile justice policy debate.
IV. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS:
PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Current criticisms of research methodology and interpretations of findings
notwithstanding, the pronouncement in the 1970s that "nothing works" was
readily accepted by policymakers as well as by the public as a whole. 20°
This point illustrates the phenomenon of cycles of ideological belief within
the arena of juvenile justice since its inception. 20 ' Bernard notes shifts
between dominant views of "harsher" treatment for juvenile offenders and
views of more "lenient" treatment as the best resolution of the juvenile crime
problem. 2°2 These shifts, according to Bernard, represent a cyclical pattern
that has been repeating since the creation of a separate mechanism for
dealing with these young offenders. 2 3 Krisberg and Austin compare these
shifts to the swinging of an ideological pendulum, noting that social policy
views of the 1970s represented a swing back to notions of punishment and
incarceration as the best practices where juvenile offenders were con-
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SHIREMAN & REAMER, supra note 68, at 85.

See BERNARD, supra note 15, at 3.
See id.
See id.

364

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 10

cemed. 2°4
Two primary factors have been noted as causes for these shifts. First is
public perception of overall juvenile crime rates. °
Second is public
perception of the best practices for dealing with criminal offenders, both
adult and juvenile. 206 A third, largely overlooked, factor that may be more
important than the first two, is the way in which juveniles 20are
socially
7
constructed as the target population of juvenile justice policies.
Bernard argues that the same cycle of juvenile justice policies has
repeated three times since 1820.208 The cycle begins when both the general
public and policymakers view juvenile crime as a serious problem that has
reached levels higher than in the past.2°9 It then continues with the system
responding with harsher sanctions for these offenders. 210 When these
sanctions have little or no effect on the perception of the level of juvenile
crime, their harsh nature results in calls for more lenient policies.21
Finally, juvenile crime persists, leading to a call for harsher sanctions, and
the cycle repeats.212 One of the limitations in the history of juvenile justice
policy has been the absence of a viable "middle ground" for the treatment of
youthful offenders. Bernard argues that policy tends to remain stuck in this
cycle because policy alternatives are generally perceived as an either-or,
punishment-nonpunishment situation. 213 Therefore, the political climate
tends to continue to oscillate between these two extremes.21 4
This theory of cycles operates independently of actual changes in juvenile
crime rates.215 Indeed, research shows that these kinds of cycles occur
during periods when juvenile crime, and even violent juvenile crime, has
remained relatively stable.21 6 Many recent "get tough" policies towards
juveniles labeled as chronic, serious, and/or violent offenders seem to have
largely followed this kind of cycle, fueled by the 1970s "nothing works"
doctrine. 217 As pointed out, the serious flaws in this research did not seem
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to dampen the effect of the doctrine on policy.218 Some have noted that
this research citing the failure of juvenile offender treatment programs
occurred at a time when demographic changes resulted in a swell in the
juvenile population and coincided with general frustration around the
effectiveness of social programs as a whole.219 This public frustration
further contributed to the belief that harsher sanctions were necessary for
young offenders. 2
Analyses of efficacy undertaken by Martinson and by others during the
1960s and 1970s raised many questions regarding the application of social
science methods to policy analysis. 22 However, the most serious issue
raised regards the extent to which state-of-the-art social science methods are
able to accurately report the effectiveness of a given policy.222 That is, are
programs themselves failing, or are the reputed failures better characterized
as a reflection of limitations in both the assumptions and methods of social
science research? 223 Several years following his "almost nothing works"
statement, Martinson himself retracted a large portion of his interpretations,
conceding that analysts simply do not know if treatment interventions as a
whole work and acknowledging that some programs are beneficial while
others have no effects or detrimental effects. 224 The fact that Martinson's
work was widely accepted while modem social science evidence to the
contrary seems to be gaining ground much more slowly, at least in the eyes
of the public and of the politicians, 225 raises another important question.
Can social science research influence public opinion and juvenile justice
policy decisions in a meaningful way? In other words, can the cycle of
juvenile justice described by Bernard be broken, and if so, how?
The notion of juvenile justice policy cycles, as outlined by Bernard,
shares many similarities with the concept of "degenerative policy-making"
outlined by Schneider and Ingram. 226 Schneider and Ingram state that
"degenerative policy-making systems are characterized by an unequal
distribution of political power, social constructions that separate the
'deserving' from the 'undeserving,' and an institutional culture that
legitimizes strategic, manipulative, and deceptive patterns of communication
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and uses of political power.
Four types of "policy targets" are identified by this framework:
advantaged populations, contenders, dependents, and deviants. 228 Advantaged populations are those who have political power and who are seen
as valuable, contributing members of society.229 These individuals are
positively constructed by society. Contenders have political power, but are
socially constructed in a negative light, for example, "big business. 230
Dependent populations are those who, while seen in a positive manner, do
not wield political power.23 ' Deviants also do not possess any political
power, but are also negatively socially constructed - that is, they are seen
as detrimental to society. 232 Applying this kind of framework to Bernard's
cycle theory demonstrates that the social construction of juveniles might have
drastic effects on juvenile justice policy.
Implied in the earlier discussion of juvenile rights is that youth in
America have almost no political power. They do not vote and seldom have
a voice in political issues. Therefore, whether youthful offenders are
positively or negatively constructed in society might have a great deal to do
with perceptions of the "best" juvenile justice policy. If juvenile offenders
are viewed by an outside group that does have political power as needing
help and guidance from the government, then they will be constructed as a
"dependent" population.233 Such was the case in the early juvenile justice
movement that looked to the concept of "parens patrie" as empowering the
court to see to the "'best interests of the child.' ,234 On the other hand, if
youthful offenders are viewed as a danger to society and not amenable to
treatment, they will be constructed as "deviants," and therefore undeserving
of government assistance.235 This latter view seems to be characteristic of
current "get tough" stances on juvenile crime that stress the protection of
society.
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Further complicating this issue is the adult "public," which is certainly
an advantaged population, holding both "deserving" status and considerable
political power.237 Therefore, it could be assumed that the way in which
this advantaged population decides to socially construct juvenile offenders,
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either basing their construction on perceptions of the level and the seriousness of juvenile crime, or some other social indicator, might be the largest
factor in the creation and implementation of juvenile justice policies.
Whether or not this view can be accurately demonstrated, it certainly
warrants further investigation, particularly in light of possible limitations to
the role that social science can play in shaping policies toward chronic,
serious, and/or violent juvenile offenders.
V. THE FUTURE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICY RESEARCH
Improvements in social science methods used to analyze juvenile justice
policy made in the past two decades have done much to further our
understanding of the effects of various policy directives on chronic, serious,
and/or violent juvenile offenders. However, the continuation of heated debate
regarding the future of juvenile justice in the United States indicates the need
for additional research in this area. Many policy effects, such as the possible
unfair and differential treatment of offenders, certainly need more analysis.
Further, past research has shed little light on the role of public opinion and
the social construction of offenders in the creation of juvenile justice policy.
I would propose that, as the juvenile justice system ends its first century of
operation, researchers address these questions, in addition to analyzing
efficiency and efficacy, in order to form a more comprehensive understanding
of juvenile justice policy.
Research must continue in the area of policy outcomes for individual
offenders. An understanding of what works in offender treatment is needed
in order to decide which are the best methods of ensuring the protection of
society, without resorting to expensive and restrictive methods of incapacitation. A comparison of different treatment options with incarceration
methods based on offender outcomes should be done based not only on
recidivism, but also on frequency of subsequent offending and the seriousness
of subsequent offending. Furthermore, such comparisons need to take into
consideration the economic impacts of these programs, as well as other
anticipated system impacts such as facility overcrowding. Research results
must also be more widely disseminated. In order to break out of current
juvenile justice policy cycles, the public, politicians, and justice-system
personnel should be educated about possible policy effects so that informed
rather than knee-jerk decisions can be made. In addition to considering
offender outcomes, policies must be evaluated and judged based on their
ability to react to the actions of juvenile offenders, and not on system
reactions to predictions of offender behavior, or socio-demographic offender
characteristics.
Additionally, more analysis is needed in the area of the formation and
implementation of specific policies.
The role of public opinion and
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inaccurate perceptions regarding levels of juvenile crime are a vital
component of policy analysis and have yet to be systematically addressed by
the literature. Studies of media influence, dissemination of statistical data to
the public and practitioners, and analysis of the underlying political issues of
juvenile justice policy are still very much lacking. Analysis must include a
study of the legal rights of juveniles and the implications for juvenile justice
created by changing the interpretation of those rights.
Finally, juvenile justice policy analysis must take into account the diverse
populations that have a stake in juvenile justice policy outcomes. These
include the general public, politicians, justice-system personnel, legislative
decisionmakers, and lobbyists. But more importantly, this analysis must
include an examination of crime victims and criminal offenders, including
how these populations are viewed by society and a dissection of the social
movements that underlie juvenile justice policy change.
This framework is undoubtedly incomplete, as is this review of current
perspectives of juvenile justice policy. However, it is vital that this important
first step in adding to the existing body of social science research be made.
Positivist-driven research has its place and usefulness in modem juvenile
justice policy analysis. However, this method alone is insufficient for
reaching a comprehensive understanding of how policy is made and how it
influences different populations. Much remains unknown about the fate of
the juvenile court, and it is clear that the next century will bring many
challenges to its survival. Informed debate regarding all aspects of the
system must take place if these challenges are to be answered.

